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Abstract 
Growing interest in the area of participation especially at the local level stems from the belief that democratic 
approaches to governance achieve better development outcomes. Over the past decade, World Bank has been 
promoting Community-Driven Development (CDD) programs, an approach that is believed to give local people 
total control over development projects. Using the qualitative approach to research, the study relies on secondary 
data and extant literature on decentralization theory and practice.  Various legal frameworks in Ghana 
underpinning decentralization and local governance were utilized to extrapolate challenges of central 
government fiscal and financial policies on local government programmes, drawing very much on the history, 
structure and policies of decentralization in Ghana.  
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Introduction 
Local participation is a proposed method of achieving a variety of goals such as sharpening poverty targeting, 
improving service delivery, expanding livelihood opportunities, and strengthening demand for good governance. 
Growing interest in the area of participation especially at the local level stems from the belief that bottom-up 
approaches to governance achieve better development outcomes (Chambers1983, Crook & Manor1998). 
Decentralization is also believed to promote democracy through the inclusion of local voices in development 
processes (World Bank 2004). The purpose of these participatory programs is to enhance the involvement of the 
poor and the marginalized in community-level decision-making bodies in order to give citizens greater say in 
decisions that affect their lives.  
Decentralization refers to efforts to strengthen village and municipal governments on both the demand 
and supply sides. On the demand side, decentralization strengthens citizens’ participation in local government by, 
for example, instituting regular elections, improving access to information, and fostering mechanisms for 
deliberative decision making. On the supply side, it enhances the ability of local governments to provide services 
by increasing their financial resources, strengthening the capacity of local officials, and streamlining and 
rationalizing their administrative functions (Shah 2006).  
Local government (LG) on the other hand, refers to specific institutions or entities created by national 
constitutions, by state constitutions, by ordinary legislation of a higher level of central government , by 
provincial or state legislation, or by executive order to deliver a range of specified services to a relatively small 
geographically delineated area. (Shah 2006).  
Local governments deliver a wide variety of services but with varying degrees of authority and 
responsibility for the service provision. These services, such as pre and primary education, social welfare, health 
clinics, cemeteries, museums and libraries, water and sanitation, refuse collection, environmental protection and 
transport, are provided by the local government, but with varying degrees of authority and political responsibility 
for the service provision.  The central government’s inability to devolve completely authority to the local 
governments to operate fully makes the provision of the above services difficult.  As Mohan, (1996) puts it, local 
institutions are to some a large extent established by central government and are hence not immune from central 
control.  The Ghanaian decentralization programme is fraught with a lot of challenges when it comes to 
providing the needed services to the citizens at the local level due to certain constraints with the release of funds 
to support the various programmes.  The government of Ghana fiscal policy on allocation of funds for 
decentralization programme is clear yet the implementation of this policy is always a challenge. This paper 
therefore examines the challenges of central government fiscal and financial programmes on local government 
programmes in Ghana.  
 
Methodology 
This is a conceptual research paper that tries to assess Ghana’s fiscal decentralization process and key challenges 
inherent in the system.  The study utilizes the qualitative approach to social research. This approach is chosen in 
that it is deemed appropriate for exploratory and explanatory studies on which this study is based (Babbie, 2004). 
The study relies on secondary data and extant literature on decentralization theory and practice.  Various legal 
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frameworks in Ghana underpinning decentralization and local governance, including the 1992 Republican 
Constitution, the Local Government Act (Act 462), the District Assembly Common Fund (Act 455), the Local 
Government Service Act (Act 656) and the National Development Planning Act (Act 480) are analyzed.  .     
 
Literature review 
The concept of decentralization has been expressed by various authors to mean local participation in governance 
to achieve a variety of goals, including sharpening poverty targets, improving service delivery, expanding 
livelihood opportunities, and strengthening demand for good governance.   Decentralization has been used 
extensively in the literature, and scholars have various perspectives regarding it. The concept of decentralization 
and its interpretations have become a battleground for a variety of disciplines and theories (Antwi- Boasiako, 
2010: 168). 
Falleti (2005: 329) defines decentralisation as “a process of state reform composed by a set of public 
policies that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government in the 
context of a specific type of state.” This definition is characterized by four distinguishing features: which state 
inter alia  
Decentralisation is conceived as a process of public policy reform and not as a description of 
the state of being of a political or fiscal system at a point in time; Lower levels of government 
are recipients of the transferred responsibilities, resources, or authority; Because 
decentralisation is a process of state reform, transition to a different type of state necessarily 
implies commencement of a new decentralisation sequence; and The degree of authority 
devolved to Local Governments determines the levels and types of administrative, fiscal, and 
political decentralisation policies 
Decentralization in the Ghanaian context according to Ayee (2008), is the ‘transfer of significant 
authority, responsibility for services and fiscal and human resources to local government units for the 
development of their areas. It is the reduction of poverty and also involving legal and administrative measures to 
transfer authority, resources, accountability and rules from central government to local entities’.  
The main rationale for decentralization is to promote participatory democracy and to bring governance 
closer to the people as well as to improve service delivery thus making government more responsive to local 
needs and preference.  The point has been argued that the basis for decentralization ‘stems largely from the idea 
that decentralization will promote better governance as local officials are supposedly more aware of, and more 
responsive to, local needs’ and provides locals with the chance to have control (Duncan, 2007: 713, cited in 
Antwi-Boasiako, 2010). The overall goal is to redress the over-centralization of power at the national level, 
improve the rural–urban imbalance and enhance local participation in national decision making (Ahwoi, 1992; 
2011). 
White (2011) argues that, Ghana’s decentralization as a government system encompasses three main 
facets that are commonly related. The first which is deconcentration is the process whereby the central 
government disperses responsibilities for certain services to regional branch offices without any transfer of 
associated authority. According White, many scholars do not consider this as true decentralization.  The second, 
delegation refers to a situation in which the central government transfers responsibility for decision making and 
administration of public functions to subnational governments. Here, local governments are accountable to 
central governments but are not fully controlled by the central governments; and the third which is devolution 
happens when the central government transfers authority for decision making, finance, and administrative 
management to quasi autonomous units of local government. 
White (2011) posits that, a lot of literature considers devolution to be the most extensive form of 
decentralization. Ayee (1996) reiterates this view that Ghana’s approach to decentralization appears to place 
much emphasis on devolution which involves the transfer of power to Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies (MMDAs) and are given the absolute autonomy and associated responsibility to determine the level 
of services required, the best methods to ensure their provision and the sources and type of funds to finance such 
services efficiently and make them more effective. 
The literature on inter-governmental decentralization distinguishes three different forms of 
decentralization as follows; administrative decentralization, political decentralization and fiscal decentralization.  
 
Administrative decentralization 
Administrative decentralization may be in the form of deconcentration where local officials have no decision 
making power or delegation where local officials may have some minor decision-making powers (Crook & 
Manor,1998: 6–7). The local government administration is usually headed by a centrally appointed executive 
official who is accountable directly to the central government. 
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Political Decentralization 
Political or democratic decentralization refers to transfer of some powers from central government politicians to 
elected local government politicians who are given autonomy to determine all their local processes of 
development (Smith, 1996). Such autonomy may be enshrined in a country’s constitution or be legislated. For 
political decentralization to move beyond platitudes, a set of constitutional amendments, legal instruments, and 
electoral reforms is designed to open new or reactivate existing but dormant spaces for representation of LG 
politics. The reform may result in election instead of appointment of councilors and mayors; creation of local 
councils with the power to make laws and authorize the use of budgeted finance by executives; enabling of 
citizens to recall their councilors for underperformance or vote them out during elections; and autonomy of local 
councils to hire, motivate, manage and fire local bureaucrats without central government interference. 
 
Fiscal Decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization has become a major concern for many countries in the decentralization process and 
Ghana is no exception. This is mainly in the areas of externally and internally generated sources of revenue 
(Ankamah, 2012). This has become very important for subnational governments in their quest to achieve their 
desired development goals and objectives at the local level (Dick-Sagoe, 2012). Fiscal decentralization is seen as 
a system of government which involves the “assignment of responsibilities” comprising of the functions and 
activities at the various sectors of government as well as the assignment of locally generated revenues to local or 
subnational governments (Smoke, 2003).  
The UN report in 1996 puts this in a very polished manner as “...The establishment of effective and 
transparent financial management is at the core of any effort to reform the public sector...To be genuinely 
supportive of a decentralization process, the basic characteristics of a system for decentralized financial 
management should include:  
Transparency of allocation, predictability of the amounts available to local institutions and 
local autonomy of decision making on resource utilization.  
In contrast with the widespread practice of ad hoc grants driven by politics, the allocation of resources 
should be based on transparent formulas. In spite of the  unpredictable nature of most central-to-local transfer 
mechanisms prevailing in developing countries, the process should provide local institutions with an up-front 
indication of how much money will be available in the next multiyear planning cycle. This makes local strategic 
planning possible and provides a financial ceiling that makes such planning a meaningful exercise and an 
opportunity for local communities to take autonomous decisions on the use of limited resources” (UN, 1996). 
In a period of globalization, the World Bank craves for local discretion and devolution of power as a 
major force shaping governance and development as far as fiscal decentralization is concerned (World Bank, 
1997). In his analysis of some 58 countries in the early 1990s, Oates (1993) also demonstrated a more cordial 
and positive relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralization and suggests some role for 
subnational governments especially in infrastructure development. 
What has propelled the “renewed interest” in fiscal decentralization as a reform in many countries are 
the three basic reasons outlined by Kee (2003); First of all, central governments are increasingly finding that it is 
impossible for them to meet all of the competing needs of their various constituencies as well as local areas and 
are now attempting to build local capacity by the delegation of responsibilities to their regional subnational 
governments. Secondly, central governments are looking to local and regional governments to assist them on 
“national economic development strategies” and finally, regional and local political leaders are demanding more 
autonomy and want the taxation powers that come along with the associated expenditure responsibility. 
Fiscal decentralization, although encourages the devolution of resources, it does not only involve the 
transfer of resources to different levels of government. According to UNDP (2005), fiscal decentralization is also 
about how local governments are given more power to have “authority and control” in the use and management 
of their financial resources. This according to the UNDP is seen in their control over the following; (1) The 
provision of the basket of local services for which they are responsible; (2) The level of local taxes and revenues 
(base rates and collection); and (3) The grant resources with which they finance the delivery of local public 
services.  
Of all the typologies, administrative deconcentration represents the weakest form of decentralization 
because it provides the fewest direct links between decision-makers and local population. Political 
decentralization is the strongest. If administrative decentralization takes place and the organizational capacity of 
the local bureaucracy is improved through, for example, training, but it is worth noting that, without transfer of 
funds and authority to make and implement decisions, the degree of local government autonomy is constrained 
(Awortwi, 2010). Similarly, transfer of requisite funds without administrative capacity can create serious fiscal 
constraints at both local and national levels.  
The choice of any of the three different decentralization policies involves political and strategic 
calculations by the interest groups that initiate them. The overarching issue here is that politicians at the center 
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have no intention to cede their vast powers, notably those over public finances, decision-making, hiring and 
firing, to the local level, and potentially resist all three decentralization policies. Interest group politics heavily 
influences how decentralization reforms are designed (Awortwi, 2014).  
 
History of Local Government in Ghana   
Local governance in Ghana did not start with the coming of Europeans. Local communities and societies had 
their own unique ways of governing themselves. During the period before colonialisation, Local Government 
and administration centered on the chiefs or some local loyalty which was basically undefined. The chief was the 
head of government in the communities and he was supported by his elders. With the settlement of Europeans in 
the Gold Coast (now Ghana), the dynamics of local governance changed (FES, 2010). This led to the first local 
government system which was introduced in the Gold Coast in 1878, during the colonial era, by the British. The 
introduction of Local Government during this era conferred a legal basis for traditional authorities to perform 
limited local government roles including judicial and legislative activities and resources management.  
Officially, decentralization in Ghana is said to have started in the late 1870s when the British 
Government established the indirect rule which lasted until 1951. The colonial administration ruled the people of 
Ghana indirectly through the chiefs by making the chiefs and elders in any given districts as the local authorities, 
with powers to perform local government functions (Crawford, 2004). During this period of colonial rule, 
decentralization was attributed to mere de-concentration of the central government administrative structure, 
where the colonial authorities used this means to strengthen its power and control over the entire nation. Thus 
decentralization became a political tool for the British through the local chiefs and their elders to reemphasize on 
the wishes of colonial government (Antwi-Boasiako, 2010).  Between 1957 and 1988 successive governments 
attempted to devolve administration. Decentralization after Ghana’s independence era in 1957 was described by 
many scholars as ineffective. This according to Antwi-Boasiako (2010), was due to the fact that, the era was 
characterized by changes through military coups which became rampant after Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown 
in 1966. It was during the mid-1970s under the Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong’s military regime that the 
government tried to empower the local people (Nkurmah, 2000).  
 
The Nkrumah regime 
Decentralization after independence in 1957, was administrative decentralization in the form of deconcentration, 
with sectoral ministries organized in territorial hierarchies whose apex was in the national capital, and agencies 
at the local level (Ayee, 1994; 2008). Conyers (1983), notes that the interest in decentralization in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s was associated with the transition to independence and the desire to create democratic structures 
after the imposition of colonial rule.  From the 1960s to early 1970s, planning and implementation of 
development policies and programs in education, housing, health, electricity, water and sewerage, roads, and 
postal and telecommunications services were transferred to parastatals and agencies attached to central ministries 
(Amonoo, 1981; Tordoff, 1980). During this period, the Local Government Act (Act 54) of 1961 was enacted, 
with features which included efforts of a central government body, which dealt with national issues and the local 
authorities as central government agencies (Inanga and  Osei-Wusu, 2004). 
This was accomplished through an activist strategy of institution-building that was designed to 
penetrate local communities, micro-manage key political and social processes within towns and villages, and 
link localities directly to the state. Through successive reforms of the institutions of rural government inherited 
from colonial rule, the Nkrumah regime shifted local balances of power and strengthened its presence and 
influence at the grassroots. Local councils, which exercised considerable clout in the Ghanaian administrative 
system, were brought under party control and empowered at the expense of pre-existing organs of rural 
government. Working toward the same end, the regime invested tremendous effort in marginalizing the many 
chiefs and other provincial notables who contested the Nkrumah’s leadership. Co-operative indigenous 
authorities were drawn into the embrace of the regime, but the centralization of authority compromised their 
prerogatives and constricted their room for maneuver on the local level (Boone, 1998). 
The central government established nine regional administrative units to serve as links between the 
center and 65 local councils. Legislative instruments to establish local councils required them to facilitate the 
collection of local revenue for the central government and supervise sanitation and hygiene. Council works were 
undertaken by civil servants appointed by the central government. The institution of chieftaincy, which forms 
part of the traditional authority in Ghana, was recognized only at the community level. For instance, chiefs 
mobilized their people for collective action through town development committees and wielded tremendous 
power over their local people but had no powers to legislate and prosecute. All decision-making, whether it 
concerned acquisition of a license to operate a small business or ride a motorcycle or an application for a 
passport to travel abroad, had to be processed in the nation’s capital. The regional offices and their civil servants 
became the conduits through which local councils reached the central government (Awortwi 2010).  
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The Post – 1980 Era 
In the 1980s, three factors led to change; the first being the military regime of the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) led by Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings (1981–92) which banned political party activities; the 
second, a deteriorating national economy (1980–4) which reduced the real income of bureaucrats by more than 
50 percent (Merode & Thomas, 1994); and lastly the structural adjustment policies (1983–8) initiated by the 
World Bank, forcing governments to develop decentralization policy reform meant to reduce the size and 
responsibilities of central government (Mohan, 1996). In 1988, the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) introduced the current practice of decentralization process which was backed by the Local government 
law (1988) PNDC Law 207 (Assibey-Mensah, 2000).  This led to the creation of 110 District Councils and the 
setting up of the 17 District Assemblies. As argued by Antwi-Boasiako (2010:171) after over a decade of 
military dictatorship under Chairman Rawlings (1981–1991), the 1992 Republican Constitution provided a 
transition from a military rule to multi-party democracy at the national level, which also authorized the 1988 
local government reforms. Decentralization was within the overall context of a liberal democratic constitution, 
yet essential democratic elements remained compromised, especially through the retention of presidential 
appointments instead of local elections in the districts. 
In an attempt to strengthen the decentralization process as well as local government, the Fourth 
Republic, with the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, has devoted chapter twenty to such a purpose. The 
Constitution states emphatically in Article 240 that local government and its administration shall be 
decentralized, and that the functions, powers, responsibilities and resources should be transferred from the 
central government (Flagstaff House) to the local governments (Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies). The autonomy and independent role of local governments, with discretionary powers at the 
grassroots, was subject to a provision in Article 240(2b), which stipulates and directs that measures should be 
taken to enhance the capacity of local government authorities to plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and execute 
policies in respect of matters affecting local people. 
 
The legal framework of decentralization in Ghana 
The 1992 Republican Constitution spells out the legal framework that establishes Ghana’s current 
decentralization.  Under this arrangement, Article 242 requires the District Assembly (DA) to be non-partisan in 
nature; and it is the highest political authority in the district, comprising one person elected from each electoral 
area; the member of parliament (MP) from constituencies that fall within the jurisdiction of the DA; the district 
chief executive (DCE) appointed by the president with executive powers and with the prior approval of not less 
than a two-thirds majority of the members of the assembly present voting at the meeting; and the other members 
being not more than 30% of all the members of the DA appointed by the president in consultation with the 
traditional authorities and other interest groups. 
Other legislation by act of parliament such as the Local Government Act 462, 1993; District Assembly 
Common Fund Act 455, 1993; The National Development Planning Systems Act; legal instruments establishing 
the DAs; and the Local Government Service Act 656, 2003 have all sought to enhance and strengthen Ghana’s 
decentralization. For instance, Section 2 of Article 240 of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that ‘Parliament shall 
enact appropriate laws to ensure that functions, powers, responsibilities and resources are at all times transferred 
from central government to local government units in a coordinated manner’. The consequent establishment of 
the Local Government Service Act 656, 2003 was to ensure a better local government whose main objective was 
‘to secure effective administration and management of local government in the country’. It was charged with the 
following responsibilities: the commencement of functioning decentralized departments at the DAs, transfer of 
functions to the relevant decentralized departments, transfer of staff from the Civil Service to the Local 
Government Service, and establish a performance-based management system for both human resource and 
service delivery. 
The DAs are tasked to perform 86 functions that to empowers them to provide deconcentrated and 
devolved local public services and also the overall development of the district…shall ensure the preparation and 
submission… for approval of the plan and budget for the district (Local Government Act, 1993). The DAs act on 
the advice of District Tender Boards; DAs are the sole taxing authority in the districts; and they also make 
byelaws. 
The above prescriptions notwithstanding, decentralization has not been able to entrust to local 
governments enough autonomy or real power to initiate and execute their plans and policies. The context and 
history of Ghana’s decentralization, and most of the laws pertaining to local government that are still in the 
system, have hindered the transfer of real power and resources to the local governments, thereby strengthening 
central government’s position vis-à-vis the DAs. 
 
Decentralization policies 
Awotwi (2011), citing Rondinelli, (1981) argues that, decentralization has been defined in many ways on the 
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basis of what the policy aims to achieve: transferring responsibility for planning, management, and resource-
raising from the Central Government to field units of  ministries or agencies, changing relationships of power 
and subordination between central and sub-national levels and redefining the functional roles of units at each of 
these levels (Elcock and Minogue, 2001: 101); and creating open, responsive and effective Local Government 
systems for decision-making (UNDP, 1998: 4). 
 
Policy on Fiscal decentralization in Ghana  
The Constitution of Ghana prescribes a devolved form of decentralization where there is a transfer of authority 
for decision-making, finances and management from the central to the local governments. However, the central 
government still performs many functions that should be moved to the district level and controls the majority of 
regional and district financial resources. 
The objective of the Decentralization Policy Framework issued by the Ministry of Local Government, 
Rural Development and Environment in 2008 is to   
“…deepen political, administrative and fiscal decentralization in Ghana and to reaffirm the 
Government’s commitment to the policy of decentralization in conjunction with people’s 
participation.” 
 Awotwi (2011) citing Fjelstad, (2001) and Prud’Homme, (2003) has noted that,  fiscal decentralization involves 
four policies to increase fiscal autonomy of Local Governments: 
• expenditure assignment clearly delineating the CG’s and LGs’ responsibilities for providing and paying 
for specific services to citizens; 
• revenue assignment demarcating taxable revenue sources as well as tax-raising powers between the CG 
and LGs and possibly creating a new sub-national tax to strengthen the fiscal base of LGs and give 
them authority to decide how to spend their revenue; 
• inter-governmental policy enabling a CG to transfer financial resources in the form of grants to LGs; 
and  
• regulatory policy to monitor and set limits on LG finances (Fjelstad, 2001; Prud’Homme, 2003). 
Expenditure assignments to the local governments shall be in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, where tasks are transferred to the lowest possible level closest to the people. The expenditure 
assignment shall be well defined for each tier of governance to pursue efficiency and accountability. Revenue 
assignment should be clearly defined and aligned with the DAs function and commensurate with these, allowing 
the DAs sufficient room to adjust revenues to local needs.  
The legal framework for the expenditure and revenue assignment shall be clearly stipulated to avoid 
doubts and conflict. Fiscal transfer systems shall be harmonised, made simple, objective, fair transparent, timely, 
poverty sensitive and with an element of performance base allocation of funds to promote DA efficiency and 
good governance.  
The main sources of funding for the district assemblies are internally generated funds, central 
government transfers, development partner support and access to borrowing. Internally generated funds (IGF) 
include rates, fees and levies, grants-in aid under Article 252 of the Constitution, and 55% of the Stool Land 
revenue. Central government transfers consist of the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) under Act 455, 
Getfund (Act 581), and the support of the decentralized departments by MDAs in the form of direct salary 
payments or transfers for administrative, service and investment costs. 
 
Benefits of Fiscal Decentralization 
The literature on fiscal decentralization suggests several benefits attributable to fiscal decentralization inspite of 
all the challenges outlined above. These include; improvements in the level and quality of local services; 
improvements in revenue sources; better matching of local services to the preferences of local constituencies; 
and greater accountability.  Prud’homme (2003) identifies four major policy areas are impacted by fiscal 
decentralization policies: economic efficiency, macro-economic stability, interregional or interpersonal equity 
and political efficiency.  
The argument that fiscal decentralization increases economic efficiency according to Prud’homme  is 
based on the fact that demand for public goods and services varies from place to place, that this demand cannot 
be known and therefore cannot be satisfied by the central government. This demand, however, is known by the 
various local governments and they will provide their constituents with what they want. With decentralization, 
different bundles of public services will be provided in each jurisdiction and they will better match the various 
tastes of each jurisdiction, and therefore increase allocative efficiency (Oates, 1972). Thus local governments are 
responsive to local demand providing such services as education, health and transportation. 
Inter-personal disparities which relate to the distribution of income between individuals or households 
aims at improving the lot of the poorer, or ‘fighting poverty’. Taken from the viewpoint of decentralization, 
inter-regional disparities imply that, on average, people in local areas are poorer than people in urban areas. The 
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people from each jurisdiction, be it local or regional, often have a feeling of identification with their jurisdiction. 
Irrespective of their own income, are interested in the average income of their community. This generates a 
strong demand for more inter-regional equity and redistribution. 
The political implications of decentralization facilitate and increases local participation in political 
decision-making which brings about social benefits. Here people are committed to make decisions they take 
themselves work than decisions that are imposed upon them. Decentralization ensures active local governments 
are a school of democracy, for both the electorate at large and for politicians. People become accustomed to 
discussing social issues and choices that relate to the locals. This makes them better-informed citizens in general. 
Local governments are also an effective training ground for politicians. Finally, stronger sub-national 
governments are a useful counter-power to the central government where they curb the temptation of 
authoritarian central governments.  
 
Challenges 
District assemblies have not been able to operate at full capacity due to the fact that the IGF which is their main 
source of revenue is inadequate. This has resulted in most District assemblies depending solely on the DACF. 
The DACF is a statutory provision by the DACF Act, Act 455, which directs the government to allocate at least 
5% (subsequently increased to 7.5%) of national revenues to local governments, which is to be shared by 
formula. The Formula, of DACF adopts the “Basic Needs” approach and considers the following as its indicators; 
Health Services, Education Services, Water Coverage, Tarred Road Coverage. Under this approach, those who 
have more facilities or services receive less to bridge the development gap (culled from DACF website). 
It is interesting to note that all funds generated by the district assemblies go into central government 
coffers, and then the central government will transfer to the assemblies funds in the form of DACF to 
the District assemblies to use for development as and when necessary based on the budgets presented.  
This accounts for reasons some projects that have been planned for the districts delay or are abandoned. The lack 
of funds or delay in receiving funds from central governments to work with renders the assembly unresponsive 
to the needs of their community. 
The decisions about the use and management of the DACF have been usurped by the central 
government so that the DAs remain objects of ridicule which lack the necessary finances to implement their 
decisions. For instance, deductions are made at source without the knowledge of the DAs. Central government 
continued control over the DAs has reduced the potency of the DACF as an effective instrument of 
decentralization and democratization. The introduction of the DACF under Act 455 as an incentive to augment 
revenue base of District Assemblies appears to have made most of the Assemblies renege on their local base 
resource (internally generated funds) mobilization efforts (Asiamah 2014). The DACF also suffers irregularities 
in the disbursement of funds; there is a lack of transparency afforded to district authorities over the allocation of 
funds. 
By way of illustration, it is a well-known fact that, although the Constitution stipulates that at least 5% 
of national revenue must be assigned to local governments, only 3–4% was transferred between 1994 and 2000 
(Awortwi, 2003). In most cases, the DACF, which is the major source of revenues to local governments, get 
delayed for two to three quarters. For instance, the late and non-payment of the DACF and other non-statutory 
funds for the period 2012–2014 posed major challenges to the MMDAs in their attempt to carry out their 
functions bestowed by Article 245 and the Local Government Act (Act 462). Granted without admitting that the 
state does not have enough funds; is the moneys (5–7.5%) allotted to MMDAs that should be sacrificed, as 
sarcastically posed by Assiamah, (2014). 
Fiscal decentralization has not been well promoted in Ghana due to the failure of the Ministry of 
Finance to effectively implement composite budgeting. In addition, centralized laws on fiscal policies of Ghana 
such as the Financial Administration Decree (FAD), 1979; and Financial Administration Regulation (FAR) 
Financial Memorandum of Local and Urban Councils, 1961, and even the Local Government Act do not 
promote a segregation of the DA budget from that of the central government. Because these appear to favour the 
central government, they still exist in the legal framework underpinning decentralization in Ghana (Assiamah 
2014) 
Prud’homme (1995) also finds some shortfalls of the fiscal decentralization model. He suggests that 
fiscal decentralization be adopted in countries where there are roughly even regional capacities. However, this 
situation is not common in many countries especially in developing countries. Moreover, the redistribution of 
national income should be by the central government and not the sub national government. This is as a result of 
the fact that, it can lead to the poor in developed and higher income regions to be better off than their 
counterparts in the less developed and low income areas. Also in regions where the policy is to impose higher 
taxes on the rich and redistribute to the poor, the rich might migrate to areas where the tax policy favors them 
making the poor in such areas to be poor for good making the model “self defeating”. In addition, it may lead to 
a “destructive competition” among regions to attract investors by way of “lowering their taxes and improving 
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subsidy”. Prud’homme further argues that the motive behind decentralization of revenues is not the same as 
expenditure; and “in many cases the problem is not so much in whether a certain service should be provided by a 
central, regional, or local government, but rather how to organize the joint production of the services by the 
various levels”  
Another challenge is that, until fiscal decentralization was introduced in 1994, there was no basis for 
calculating grants to Local Governments and only small amounts were given at the discretion of the Local 
Government ministry. Normally, the Central Government would wait until November/December to transfer its 
unspent money to Local Governments. In 1990, the Central Government allowed DAs to collect some taxes 
which were then collected by the Internal Revenue Service. This revenue was shared by all the local councils 
according to a formula determined only by the Local Government ministry. In 1994 the ceded revenue was 
replaced by a constitutional provision mandating the Central Government to transfer 5% of the national revenue 
to Local Governments. An independent common fund administrator was appointed to develop a formula for 
sharing out the fund. Even though the constitution mandated 5%, only 3–4% of national revenue was actually 
transferred to Local Governments from 1994 to 2000 (Awortwi, 2003).  
 
Conclusions 
Decentralization which is a form of local participation in the developed and developing countries will yield 
positive results if governments have the strong will to develop policies and structures for its implementation. The 
challenges of decentralization, identified as central government’s inability to devolve the necessary powers to the 
districts to fully operate and inadequate funds and lack of political will in the implementation of the policies does 
not allow the country to realize the full benefits of the programme. That notwithstanding, there are several 
benefits associated with the implementation of decentralization such as bringing governance to the door steps if 
the local people makes it worth pursuing. The case of Ghana is an example of the good intensions that 
decentralization has on paper, yet be it political or administrative or fiscal decentralization, there remains much 
to be learned from all the challenges that the local government system poses.  Central government must of 
necessity be willing to devolve authority to the local governments to work at full capacity to ensure the 
achievement of decentralization policies in the 21st century.   
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